Abstract: Privacy as a basic human need has always existed and is crucial for the development of the individual as well as society. But technological developments such as the spread of computers and more recently the internet pose a threat to its protection. Attempts at regulating the collection, storage, transmission and use of person-related data to protect privacy in the face of such challenges have taken many forms which can analytically be distinguished; but the simultaneous existence of international, supranational and national level attempts have led to the emergence of a complex situation in reality. Internationally, voluntary "codes of practice" coexist with binding rules of differing legal quality; nationally, comprehensive legislation spanning the private and public sectors, with implementation overseen by an agency, can be distinguished from piecemeal legislation without specific overview. Such differences, together with competing economic and security interests as well as variations in the ultimate justification of the protection of privacy, have led to international conflicts around the transmission of person-related data for commercial and security purposes. Given the increasing economic importance of such data, as well as rising sensitivity towards the protection of privacy in many populations, regulatory competition in this field is likely to increase in the future, while the direction of that dynamic is difficult to predict.
Introduction
The debate about the regulation of privacy has in recent years above all been linked to technological developments and their uses. From the 1960s onwards, the emergence and spread of computers, data banks, telecommunication, and eventually the internet have led to several waves of concerned public debate about the impact they have on privacy, society, and the state (see as representative publications Packard 1964; Miller 1971; Burnham 1983; Sykes 1999; O'Harrow 2006) . In this perspective, individual privacy is threatened by person-related information which can be stored electronically and easily transmitted. Such information has increased massively in recent years; the capacity for cheap storage has grown even more quickly, and since such information can be digitally processed and cross-linked, new data can be generated from very diverse sources of information, giving them a new quality and allowing very detailed portraits of individual people, their preferences and their characteristics to be created. Regulatory challenges in this field thus include the questions of who is allowed to collect and store such data; by whom and for what purposes they can be retrieved; and what legitimate uses they can be put to. In several countries, disputes about the power of internet search giant Google (whose corporate aim it is to "to organize the world's information and make it universally accessible and useful" and whose activities range from scanning books to filming streets) have recently indicated the growing fears of citizens and their representatives about losing control over valued person-related information, moving the issue of regulation in this field up on the political agenda.
Looking at privacy from that angle one could be led to believe that it is a new and modern concept. Indeed it was long assumed that primitive societies neither knew nor demanded privacy. In the late 1940s, anthropologist Margaret Mead, in her famous study on "Coming of age in Samoa" argued that in a society which lived in houses without walls, where there were no separate sleeping quarters, and little clothing was worn, "there is no privacy and no sense of shame". 1 But further research has shown this view to be factually not correct. Even primitive societies had "distance" and "avoidance" rules to provide for some degree of individual privacy. Privacy norms were thus not absent; they were just harder to realise under the living, working and economic conditions of primitive societies (cf. the summary of research in Westin 1967, p.13-18) . While privacy is a basic human need and constitutive for the individual, without a society, there would be no intrusion and hence no need for privacy as protection against intrusion. Since societies differ, however, the desire or need for privacy varies historically (Moore 1984, ch. 1) , and demand for privacy has grown substantially in the process of modernisation. Nuclear families living in individual households; urbanisation and the anonymity of city life; mobility in work and residence; the weakening of religious authority -all these factors contributed to this development since they increased chances for privacy. At the same time,
however, countervailing forces developed as well: greater population density and new technical instruments made possible new ways to encroach upon privacy or engage in surveillance.
Despite the intense debates about privacy in recent decades, a generally accepted definition has so far failed to emerge. "Few values so fundamental to society as privacy have been left so undefined in social theory or have been the subject of such vague and confused writing by social scientists", Westin (1967, p. 7) remarked in his seminal study on the subject many years ago. And more than four decades later, a recent major study still starts by admitting that privacy "is a concept in disarray.
Nobody can articulate what it means." (Solove 2008, p. 1 Almost as varied have been the academic disciplines that have debated privacy over the last decades. Legal scholars have discussed the amount to which the protection of privacy is granted by constitutional protection, how it relates to the right to free speech, or how the law of torts relates to the issue (Prosser 1960) . Feminist scholars have argued that existing legal provisions protecting family matters from state interference in the name of privacy can seriously disadvantage women seeking protection from abuse (Schneider 1991; see also Gavison 1992) . In political philosophy, liberal thinking has been predominant, regarding privacy as a property of the individual, important for his or her self-interest mainly for self-development and/or the establishment of intimate or human relationships (Rossler 2005) . But this has been criticised by authors from a communitarian perspective who argue that privacy should not be an "unbounded or privileged good" (Etzioni 1999, p. 195) because an exclusive focus on individual rights can harm the needs and values of society.
This paper looks at the regulation of privacy through a perspective of "data protection" (Bennett 1992 ) because use of modern technology is the main threat to privacy understood as "the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others." (Westin 1967, p. 7) . It surveys attempts to protect privacy through regulation both on the international and national level, and analyses actors and the tools they use. In recent years, conflicts about the regulation of privacy have emerged also on the international level because of different approaches, priorities and values, and a number of them are described and analysed in the next part. A concluding part looks at the challenges for the regulation of privacy in the 21st century.
International sources of regulating privacy
Since digital data move with ease across national borders and around the globe, the international level would seem to be the right place for the regulation of privacy. The Convention contains basic principles for data protection which every participating country should consider in its domestic legislation. This common core contains basic information privacy principles, namely that personal data should be obtained and processed fairly and lawfully; be stored only for specified and legitimate purposes; not be excessive in relation to those purposes; be accurate and kept up to date; and permit identification of the data subjects for no longer than is required and rules for mutual assistance between the contracting parties.
As the CoE has no supranational legal structure, it has no mechanism for enforcing compliance with the rules set out in the Convention; other weaknesses of the 1981
Convention include that many of the terms used are left undefined (which has not helped in the harmonisation of national data protection legislation), and that it does not include provisions for the transfer of data to non-contracting parties. Kong (Bygrave 2008: 28) .
As the issue of transborder data flows became more important, the OECD in 1985 adopted a "Declaration on Transborder Data Flows" which pledged support for international exchange of data and information and opposed "unjustified barriers" to it; and in 1998, a "Declaration on the Protection of Privacy on Global Networks" followed, acknowledgeding the different approaches taken by member countries in their data protection policies while confirming the importance of effective privacy protection for the future development of e-commerce. The OECD even set up an online "Privacy Statement Generator" which allowed easy complilation of a specific privacy statement for websites. 6 While the focus of the OECD was clearly on privacy with a view to commercial and economic issues, the United Nations' "Guidelines Concerning Computerized Personal Data Files" were primarily motivated by human rights considerations. Following from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) which contained privacy protection provisions in its Article 12, the Guidelines adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1990 contained principles that formulate "minimum guarantees that should be adopted in national legislations". Again similarities exist with the CoE Convention and the OECD Guidelines, but two innovations are the "principle of accuracy" which calls for data holders "to conduct regular checks on the accuracy and relevance of the data recorded"; and the application of the guidelines to personal data files kept by governmental international institutions. The most important fact, however, is that with the UN taking up a stance on privacy the topic had clearly started to move beyond the developed "Western world".
During the 1990s, the increasing use of the internet brought the issues of electronic commerce and the privacy implications of transborder data flows on the agenda. In 1995, the European Union passed its "Directive on the Protection of Personal Data approaches, several elements are missing (such as the purpose specification and the openness principle), and no rules about data exports to countries with lower data protection standards are set. The APEC Framework thus seems less motivated by human rights protection than by economic interests and sets a comparatively "low standard" of data protection (Greenleaf 2005) . In Africa, legal regimes for data privacy are least developed: the "African Charter on Human and People's Rights" (1981) omits mentioning a right to privacy in its catalog of basic human rights, and none of the African countries has enacted comprehensive data privacy laws, although South Africa has started to make steps towards one (Waldo et al. 2007, p. 394) .
National tools of regulating privacy
Despite the efforts at harmonisation on the international level, different national approaches to the regulation of privacy still dominate in the early 21st century.
Moreover, these national regimes do not necessarily follow a rational blueprintindeed, they sometimes rather resemble a patchwork quilt, having evolved over the decades and adapted step-by-step to technological progress rather than making a clean regulatory break by imposing a new and consistent approach. This section gives an On the other hand, such an approach may invite "box ticking", and appear rigid in the face of shifting circumstances, thus disconnecting the situation from the desired outcomes.
In privacy regulation, both performance-based and rules-based regulation can be found. Bennett and Raab (2006) find the three main classes of policy tools in this area to be legal instruments and regulatory agencies, self-regulatory instruments, and technological instruments. Relating them to the theoretical distinction introduced above, we find that both the first and the second bridge rules-and performance-based regulation (since legislation as well as self-regulation can follow either strategy), and the third is highly privacy-specific and cannot be mapped onto the distinction.
Legal instruments regulating privacy vary in two dimensions, namely their focus on either performance or rules, and the degree to which they are comprehensive or issuespecific. In the form of "fair information practices" (FIP), performance-based regulation emerged first in the United States in the early 1970s. The "Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems" established by the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) contained the first such code, and defined the core of a policy solution to personal data protection in terms of fairness and hence justice (Regan 2008, p. 55f.) . This approach has proven influential in subsequent years in shaping the information practices of numerous private and governmental institutions, and it became the dominant US approach to information-privacy protection for the next decades (Westin 2003, p. 436 Self-regulation is a mode of regulation that works without direct government involvement, but may exist "in the shadow of public power" (Newman and Bach 2004) . Industry is usually the initiator of self-regulation, and the likelyhood of using this instrument is linked to the structure of sectoral interest representation: If strong associations exist that have the dominant firms on board, the adoption, implementation and enforcement of rules will be easier than if several associations compete for industry representation and/or dominant firms remain absent. Authored by industry, self-regulation will normally consist of codes of practice of different varieties; but in contrast to the privacy principles discussed above, they will be much more specific in the level of detail they employ (Bennett and Raab 2006: ch. 6 ).
Doubts exist, however, about the effectiveness of self-regulation in the field or privacy protection, both with respect to the underlying theory and the practical experience (Papakonstantinou 2002, p. 143) .
Regulation through technology is a third principal regulatory instrument that is highly specific as it builds privacy rules into the machinery and protocols of the Explicit statutes and regulatory agencies to oversee enforcement are the chosen mechanisms for this, and protection can be seen as being proactive, not reactive.
Historical experiences with dictatorships such as the Nazis (who used census data for the holocaust) and repressive regimes in East Europe have sensitized Europeans to the importance of data protection. In contrast, the absence of such experiences, combined with a tradition of distrust against government, led to a preference for markets and self-regulation in privacy in the United States. Privacy is seen as a property right rather than a human right, a commodity that is tradeable, and the legal system treats it like private property. Therefore the private sector and free market are seen as the most effective mechanisms for protecting privacy, with the focus being more on the consumer than the citizen. Consequently protection is often more reactive than proactive. Commission (Schwartz and Reidenberg 1996) , the US government initially did not take the threat of trade disruption in e-commerce seriously; thus negotiations between the two sides only began shortly before the directive was about to enter into effect in October 1998. And for a year, they were stuck as each side demanded the other adapt to its own modus operandi: EU officials wanted the United States to introduce appropriate formal legislation and authorities to protect privacy; US representatives insisted that their strategy to rely on independent privacy auditing agencies awarding seals for websites was the only possible solution to the conflict. 13 The logjam in the negotiations was only overcome when American lead negotiator David Aaron suggested the concept of a "safe harbor" -a set of principles to which companies would be able to subscribe and which would be considered "adequate" under the EU Directive. On this basis -and the assurances of the Federal Trade Commission to initiate legal action if companies failed to comply with their obligations -a compromise was struck which became known as the "Safe Harbor" agreement. 14 In
July 2000, the EU Commission issued a decision certifying the adequacy of the agreement with respect to the data protection directive.
Only a year later, after the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001, the focus of transatlantic disputes about person-related data regulation shifted from the economic to the security sphere. Negotiated compromise gave way to unilateral imposition of preferences, and the hopes expressed in academic literature that "Safe Harbor" had set an example for solving the problem of regulatory spill-over across jurisdictions and would become a model of future solutions for problems of this kind (Farrell 2003, p. 297 ) became dubious as two more conflicts emerged. The first was a dispute about airline passenger name records (PNRs), which included confidential information such as home addresses, credit card details, religious meal preferences and physical or medical conditions (Lyon 2003, p. 126ff.) . After US Congress passed the "Aviation and Security Act" in November 2001, airlines flying from, to or through the United
States were required to give the US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection electronic access to PNR data contained in their reservation and departure control systems. Since these were personal data protected under the EU directive, airlines only had the choice to either breach US law or European law and face the respective consequences ranging from penalties to landing rights withdrawal. Negotiations between the EU and the US took place, but far from reaching a compromise, analysis makes clear that the US side largely prevailed with its demands (Busch 2006, p. 312-314) . When the EU Commission issued an adequacy ruling for the PNR agreement in Challenges for regulating privacy in the 21st century As a political issue, the regulation of privacy is more likely to gain in salience than to lose in the years to come. This is due to the increased importance of the issue on the international level as described in the previous section, but also to growing demand from the population to protect privacy better as demonstrated by opinion polls. For irrespective of the different regulatory approaches across the Atlantic, citizens both in Europe and in the United States feel that their privacy is increasingly under threat. In the United States, already in the 1990s, the share of respondents who were "very" or policy learning, and a network of policy experts largely consisting of data protection commissioners, and this at an early point led scholars to diagnose policy convergence which was expected to continue as privacy legislation spread to more countries (Bennett 1992 , chs 3 and 4). Especially United States' privacy standards were expected to see some "ratcheting up" through a variety of mechanisms such as EU collective action and market clout, firms' desire to expand their markets and the constraints of supranational trade rules (Regan 1993; Shaffer 2000) . And some projected the EU Data Protection Directive to establish itself as a "global standard" (Heisenberg and Fandel 2004) .
In reality, things have moved far more slowly than had been expected. This (Greenleaf 2003 (Greenleaf , 2005 and help create a competitor for the EU directive.
Regulatory competition can lead to different dynamics which can either lead to tighter regulation (a "race to the top") or to lighter regulation (a "race to the bottom") (Vogel 1986 (Genschel and Plümper 1997) . As a consequence, a rationale exists for non-OECD economies such as India which compete for outsourcing of North American and European data processing to adopt the tighter European standards of privacy protection which helps them gain access to that particular market. However, whether the market logic that underlies the process outlined here will prevail remains to be seen. Others have pointed to factors impeding convergence on an international standard, including the lack of an international organisation sufficiently strong to bridge the differences in national approaches (Bygrave 2004, p. 347-348) and the importance of "legal transplantation" between national legal systems (Reidenberg 2000 . In addition, the possible influence on such a process through political pressure is an aspect that should not be discounted when trying to make probability assessments about future developments, especially in an area that is of such strategic and economic importance as regulation affecting the international exchange of data and information.
